...Demonstratives

©1994, John Perry

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...plurals

See [Nunberg, 1992], [Nunberg, 1993], [Vallee, forthcoming]

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...anaphora

See [Partee, 1989], [Condoravdi and Gawron, forthcoming]

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...quasi-indication

See [Castañeda, 1967], [Corazza, forthcoming]

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...Kinko's

I use ``Kinko's'' as a name for the Kinko's store on P street in Lincoln.

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...Omahan

Actually, I'm not sure these famous people who grew up in Omaha were all born there.

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...terms.

The following distinctions, although not the terminology, I owe to Genoveva Marti, who presents them forcefully in [forthcoming]. On this topic and elsewhere I also owe a great debt to Recanati's Direct Reference [1993], a work that can be profitably consulted on virtually any topic connected with indexicality and reference.

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...certificate.

It is easy to be led astray here. Suppose you see Jim at a party, and ask him what his name is. I tell you, and thus disclose to you a certain naming convention. Now you will be thinking of Jim Perry in a certain way at that point, perhaps as ``the man I am looking at and just asked the name of and heard saying something interesting about computers a minute ago''. So, when I tell you that man's name is ``Jim'', the association in your mind may be between the name and a certain mode of presentation of him. This does not mean that the convention I have disclosed to you is a convention linking the name with the mode of presentation. The convention links the name with Jim; it has been around since he was born, and so long before he had anything interesting to say about computers; the mode of presentation comes in only because that is how you happen to be thinking of him; the mode of presentation is involved in your way of thinking of the convention, but not the convention itself.

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...them.

More accurately, in terms introduced below, definite descriptions contribute the condition associated with them by meaning and context, their content2#2.

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...thing.

Keith Donnellan's famous distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions could be interpreted as the claim that definite descriptions do sometimes refer. I'll basically ignore this idea in this essay, simply to keep the focus on indexicals, but see also footnote 17.

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...meaning.

Burks also uses the term ``symbolic meaning'' for a property of tokens determined by the meaning of their type.

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...world.

In [1992], Ken Olson and David Levy argue that to develop an account of documents adequate for the age of duplicating machines and computers we need to distinguish types, tokens and templates.

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...tastes

Thanks to Ivan Sag for the examples.

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...made

More literally: The person such that there is a place where that person speaks 20#20 there stands at the place such that there is a person who speaks 20#20 there.

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...correct.

For a discussion of Stalnaker's approach and its relation to Reichenbach's approach and the current approach, see [Perry, 1993], pp. 51ff. Evan's complaints[Evans, 1981] about [Perry, 1977] are related. See [Perry, 1993], pp. 26ff.

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...meaning.

Note that, given our assumption that names name rather than denote, this means that the designata of names is fixed at the level of content1#1.

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...hand''.

See footnote 15.

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...describing.

As noted in footnote 9, I am offically ignoring Donnellan's distinction between attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions. This is not to imply that there is anything absurd about the idea that definite descriptions refer. Recanati has a clear conception of this. He sees terms as having or lacking a certain feature, ``ref''. In my terms, a term that has this feature contributes the object it designates to official content, whether the term names or denotes. Indexicals have this feature in virtue of their meaning. On Recanati's view definite descriptions do not have this feature built into their meaning, but it can be added at a pragmatic level in particular cases [1993]. One can surmise that David Kaplan's ``dthat'' operator [1979, 1989] is a way of making the ref feature syntactially explicit; ``dthat'' itself is, of course, open to various interpretations, even by its inventor [1989b].

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...propositions.

See the discussion in [Perry, 1990].

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...refer

Russell continued to recognize a category of ``logically proper names'' that referred, but ordinary proper names weren't among them. Interestingly, they comprised such indexicals as ``this'' and ``I''.

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...broken.

Compare what David Israel and I say on the issue of having ``narrow'' enough content in [1991].

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...himself)

For more on these themes, see [Israel,Perry and Tutiya, 1993].

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