Neural plasticity and consciousness: an enactive approach
Alva Noe

Why does neural activity in a given region of cortex get experienced one
way rather than another, as red, say, rather than green, or as visual,
say, rather than auditory? To answer this question I draw on an enactive
or sensorimotor approach to perception and perceptual consciousness. I
introduce a distinction between cortical dominance and cortical
deference, and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which
input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical
targets. In some cases, but not others, cortical activity 'defers' to the
nonstandard sources of input. Why? A solution is proposed drawing on the
enactive approach. The distinction between cortical dominance and
deference is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical
and empirical, whether or not the proposed solution turns out to be
correct. It is useful in understanding how the variety of empirical
phenomena involving neural plasticity now coming to light can be related
to philosophical issues about consciousness. This talk is based on
ongoing collaboration with the philosopher Susan Hurley (Warwick, UK), as
well as on work with the psychologist J. Kevin O'Regan (CNRS, Paris). For
more on the enactive/sensorimotor approach, see O'Regan and Nok, BBS
24/5:  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/ORegan/ .