Metaphysics, Time, and Rationality

One of the oldest problems in Metaphysics is Diodorus' Master Argument. Diodorus derived a contradiction from the conjoint assertion of three propositions: 1) Every past truth is necessary; 2) The impossible does not follow from the possible; 3) Something is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus purported to derive the negation of 3), as if he wanted "to infect the future with the necessity which belongs to the past." Following the lead of Jules Vuillemin, Necessity or Contingency. The Master Argument, CSLI Publications, Stanford University, 1996, who construed certain of the modalities as essentially tensed, and drawing on Henri Bergson's metaphysics of temporality, I have been able to defend free will against the Master argument in a novel way (see J.-P. Dupuy, "Philosophical Foundations of a New Concept of Equilibrium in the Social Sciences: Projected Equilibrium", Philosophical Studies, 100, 2000, p. 323-345.) The talk will not delve into the technical details of the demonstration but will rather explore the relevance and the implications of the proposed solution for the theory of rationality. We will show in particular how it solves elegantly some of the most nagging paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory (Newcomb, Backward Induction) and helps tackle such pressing issues as the efficiency and ethics of nuclear deterrence or the foundations of the Precautionary Principle.

Jean-Pierre Dupuy is Professor of philosophy, cole Polytechnique, Paris, and founding director of C.R.E.A. (Centre de Recherche en pistmologie Applique), the philosophical research group of the cole Polytechnique, and Full Professor (1/3rd time), Departments of French and, by courtesy, Political Science, Stanford University. He is also a Stanford C.S.L.I. Researcher, and is affiliated with the Stanford Science, Technology, and Society Program, the Symbolic Systems Forum, the Anthropology Department, and the Religious Studies Department. He is a member of the French Academy of Technology.