Conditional Intentions and Planning

Although we often express our intentions in the categorical form 'I intend to ö' or 'I will ö', we usually do not mean to say that we intend to ö *no matter what*. For most intentions there is at least a condition C such that the intention would be better described as the intention to ö if C. Despite the familiarity of conditional intentions (and the large literature on related issues¯such as indicative conditionals and conditional obligations), conditional intentions have been surprisingly neglected in the philosophical literature. This neglect could be justified if accounting for conditional intentions were a straightforward matter. But this is not so. Conditional intentions raise many puzzling questions. As a partial list, consider the following issues. First, there are many different ways of interpreting the role of the condition in avowals of intentions. Does the condition qualify the acquisition, justification, or object of the intention? Second, are clauses such as 'if I can', 'if I do not change my mind', 'if I am alive' genuine conditions on intentions? Third, under which circumstances is a conditional intention to ö if C satisfied? Does the falsity of C count? What is the agent supposed to do if she has the ability and opportunity to influence the occurrence of C, while she holds the conditional intention to ö if C? Fourth, what is the relation between conditional intentions and contingency planning? Is a conditional intention is weaker kind of commitment than an unconditional one?

In this talk, I will offer a sketch of an account of the different kinds of conditional intentions that avoids some of the confusions generated by the conflation between what I will call external conditions, internal conditions, and necessary preconditions of an intention. I will then try to answer some of the questions raise above, with particular attention to what is distinctive of conditional intentions as planning attitudes with respect to other conditional attitudes and speech acts.