[Prev][Next][Index]
CSLI Calendar, 25 May 1995, vol.10:29
-
To: friends
-
Subject: CSLI Calendar, 25 May 1995, vol.10:29
-
From: Tom Burke <burke>
-
Date: Wed, 24 May 1995 01:32:20 -0700
C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S
______________________________________________________________________________
25 May 1995 Stanford Vol. 10, No. 29
______________________________________________________________________________
A weekly publication of the Center for the Study of Language and
Information (CSLI), Stanford University, Ventura Hall, Stanford, CA 94305-4115
____________
CSLI ACTIVITIES DURING 24 MAY -- 2 JUNE 1995
WEDNESDAY, 24 MAY
1:15 - Intensional Logic Lecture
Building 90, Room 92-Q
Modal Theories of Context
Sasa Buvac, Stanford CS
4:00 - Seminar on Computational Learning and Adaptation
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Neural Network Approaches to Molecular Biology and Genetics
David Bisant, Stanford Psychology
Abstract below
THURSDAY, 25 MAY
12:15 - CSLI Seminar
Series on Intelligent Agents
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Actively Instructable Agents
Scott Huffman, Price Waterhouse
Abstract below
2:15 - CSLI Seminar
Movement of Technology from University to Industry
Cordura Hall, Room 100
SAIL Spinoffs
Les Earnest and Marty Frost, Stanford Computer Science
Abstract below
4:15 - SSP Forum
The Knoll Building, Ballroom
CCRMA Demonstration and Research Overview
Chris Chafe, Stanford Music and CCRMA
Abstract below
FRIDAY, 26 MAY
12:00 - Logic Lunch
Building 380, Room 383-N
On the Complexity of Propositional Quantification in
Intuitionistic Logic
Philip Kremer, Stanford Philosophy
Abstract below
12:30 - HCI Seminar
Skilling Auditorium
Transforming Graphical User Interfaces into
Auditory User Interfaces
Beth Mynatt, Georgia Tech Computer Science
Abstract below
2:00 - Philosophy Conference (Friday and Saturday, 26-27 May)
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Conference on Early Modern Philosophy
Contact: Alan Nelson (UC Irvine), Marleen Rozemond (Stanford)
Schedule below
3:30 - Linguistics Colloquium
Building 460, Room 146
On the "Landing Site" of "Scrambling"
Hajime Hoji, USC Linguistics
Abstract below
WEDNESDAY, 31 MAY
1:15 - Intensional Logic Lecture
Building 90, Room 92-Q
Modal Theorem Proving
Grisha Mints, Stanford Philosophy
4:00 - Seminar on Computational Learning and Adaptation
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Frameworks For Visual Learning
John Weng, Michigan State Computer Science
Abstract below
THURSDAY, 1 JUNE
10:00 - STASS Seminar
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Constraints on Reciprocity
Stanley Peters, Stanford Linguistics
Abstract below
12:15 - CSLI Seminar
Series on Intelligent Agents
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Title to be announced
Michael Fehling, Stanford Engineering-Economic Systems
2:15 - CSLI Seminar
Cordura Hall, Room 100
Aspectual Adverbs and their Anaphoric Presuppositions
Alice ter Meulen, Indiana Philosophy
Abstract below
4:15 - SSP Forum
Building 60, Room 61-F
Why We Need a Philosophy of Computation
Bryan Cantwell Smith, Xerox-PARC
FRIDAY, 2 JUNE
9:00am- CSLI Workshop (Friday through Sunday, 2-4 June)
Cordura Hall, Room 100
4th CSLI Workshop on Logic, Language, and Computation
Contact: Yookyung Kim <yookyung@csli.stanford.edu> or
Atocha Aliseda-Llera <atocha@csli.stanford.edu>
Schedule below
12:30 - HCI Seminar
Skilling Auditorium
Title and speaker
to be announced
3:15 - Philosophy Colloquium
Building 90, Room 91-A
Hobbes' Theory of Voluntary Motion
Tommy Lott, San Jose State Philosophy
3:30 - Linguistics Colloquium
Building 460, Room 146
Simple Present Tense Actions in the Discourse of a Social MUD
Lynn Cherny, Stanford Linguistics
Abstract below
____________
The CSLI Calendar appears on Thursday of each week throughout the academic
year. Announcements, abstracts, and other information to appear in the
Calendar on a given Thursday should be submitted by e-mail to
<incalendar@csli.stanford.edu> by 5:00 p.m. on the previous Tuesday.
Past issues of the CSLI Calendar, a quarterly schedule of upcoming CSLI
events, and other information about CSLI are available at URL
<http://www-csli.stanford.edu/>. The Calendar, with available abstracts, is
also posted each week to the csli.bboard newsgroup.
____________
INTENSIONAL LOGIC LECTURE
on Wednesday, 24 May
1:15 p.m., Building 90, Room 92-Q
Modal Theories of Context
Sasa Buvac
Stanford Computer Science
<buvac@sail.stanford.edu>
This is one in a series of talks on recent developments in and around modal
logic by some guest speakers, illustrating connections with linguistics,
philosophy, computer science, and AI. The first part of this quarter has been
devoted to basic techniques: models and bisimulation, frame correspondences,
modal deduction, completeness arguments, filtration and finite model property.
All interested persons are welcome! All sessions will be in 90-92Q (upstairs
colloquium room, Philosophy Department), Mondays & Wednesdays 1:15--2:30 p.m.
____________
SEMINAR ON COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING AND ADAPTATION
on Wednesday, 24 May
4:00 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Neural Network Approaches to Molecular Biology and Genetics
David Bisant
Stanford Psychology
<bisant@psych.stanford.edu>
Many difficult problems lie in the fields of molecular biology and genetics.
Most of them are characterized by a theoretical limit of success. Although
many researchers have worked on these problems, most of the significant
findings have been of interest only to computer scientists or mathematicians.
This talk will review the applications of neural networks that have produced
results of significance from the biological perspective. These areas include
protein structure prediction, phytoplankton classification, promoter
identification, ribosome binding site identification, and offspring prediction
in dairy cattle. About a third of the presentation will be original research.
____________
CSLI SEMINAR
SERIES ON INTELLIGENT AGENTS
on Thursday, 25 May
12:15 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Actively Instructable Agents
Scott Huffman
Price Waterhouse
<scott_huffman@notes.pw.com>
Broadly intelligent agents can't be pre-programmed with all the knowledge they
might need; rather, they must be able to learn new knowledge during their
lifetimes. Since agents act in service of users, one of the most powerful
sources of new knowledge is user-provided instruction. In this talk, I will
describe (and demo via video) an instructable agent called Instructo-Soar that
can be taught new tasks and other domain knowledge using interactive natural
language instructions. This active form of instruction, in which the agent
deliberately seeks out assistance, contrasts with (and complements) passive
approaches in which an agent tries to learn by silently observing its user.
Instructo-Soar uses an approach called situated explanation to learn general
knowledge from instructions. Situated explanation combines analytic and
inductive learning techniques, and makes use of constraints inherent in
different instructional contexts to guide the learning process. This allows
the agent to learn a wider variety of types of knowledge (new tasks, control
knowledge, operators' effects, objects' properties, etc.) from a wider variety
of natural language instructions (commands, statements, conditionals, etc.).
SCOTT HUFFMAN is a Research Scientist at Price Waterhouse Technology Centre in
Menlo Park. He received his B.S. from CMU, and his M.S. and Ph.D. from the
University of Michigan, where he was a student of John Laird's. This talk
describes his thesis research on instructable agents. Scott's current
research involves building agents and systems that can extract and integrate
information from heterogeneous and unstructured information sources, and that
can learn to extract information based on user-provided examples.
____________
CSLI SEMINAR
MOVEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY FROM UNIVERSITY TO INDUSTRY
on Thursday, 25 May
2:15 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
SAIL Spinoffs
Les Earnest and Marty Frost
Stanford Computer Science
<{les,me}@cs.stanford.edu>
The Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory was organized to do long range
research in A.I. but also initiated the development of interactive computing
with full graphics displays, including a precursor to "windows." Other
contributions were the first spelling checker, the internet FINGER program,
the Unix MAKE command, CAD/CAM for electronic devices, the TeX document
formatter, desktop publishing using laser printers, high performance robotics,
an advanced music synthesizer (licensed to Yamaha), computer games and public
key cryptography. Corporate spinoffs include Vicarm, Xidex, Foonly, Imagen,
Valid Logic, Lucid, Sun Microsystems and, in a rather odd way, Cisco Systems.
NOTE: This is the first in a series of informal talks and discussions which
highlight the value of open-ended basic research within universities, here and
elsewhere, particularly with regard to the payoff it has for private industry.
Government support for academic research is getting harder to obtain these
days, and it is only reasonable to turn to private industry to try to make up
the difference. Industrial Affiliate programs are not new, but they are
becoming increasingly important in this regard. To illustrate the mutual
benefit of these programs, this series of talks will present numerous ways
that new technologies move from academia to industry. We would like to
illustrate, discuss, and maybe suggest improvements on some of the ways this
happens. See URL <http://www-csli.stanford.edu/csli/> for a schedule.
____________
SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM
on Thursday, 25 May
4:15 p.m., The Knoll Building, Ballroom
CCRMA Demonstration and Research Overview
Chris Chafe
Center for Computer Research in Music and Acoustics
and Stanford Music
<cc@ccrma.stanford.edu>
The forum meeting will present a tour of recent projects and productions in
computer music at Stanford. Both commonly available and more specialized,
research-oriented computing environments will be demonstrated as well as their
use in a range of styles from pop to art music.
>From the intersection of Campus Drive and Mayfield Drive: Follow Mayfield past
Tressider parking lot until it ends at an intersection with Lomita Drive.
Turn left and go up the hill to the "villa" on the top. That's the Knoll
Building. You'll find CCRMA's entrance on the back side. Parking is in back
(a C lot).
____________
LOGIC LUNCH
on Friday, 26 May
12:00 noon, Building 380, Room 383-N
On the Complexity of Propositional Quantification
in Intuitionistic Logic
Philip Kremer
Stanford Philosophy
<kremer@csli.stanford.edu>
One natural way to extend propositional intuitionistic logic (H) to languages
with propositional quantifiers is by adding suitable quantificational axioms
to H. Such systems have been studied by Gabbay, Scedrov and others.
Another natural way is to begin with Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic
logic. A Kripke-frame is a triple (g, K, R) where K is a non-empty set, g is
a member of K, and R is a transitive and reflexive relational on K. In light
of Kripke's semantics, it is natural to take a *proposition* to be a subset P
of K such that if x is in P and if xRy then y is in P. We define a logic Hpi+
by interpreting propositional quantifiers as ranging over propositions so
understood.
Hpi+ is the intuitionistic analogue to the modal systems S4pi+, S5pi+,
S4.2pi+, etc. studied by Fine and others. It is know that S5pi+ is decidable,
and that S4pi+, S4.2pi+ and others are recursively isomorphic to second order
classical logic (L2). In this talk, we will show that Hpi+ is also
recursively isomorphic to L2 -- thus closing an open problem.
____________
SEMINAR ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION
on Friday, 26 May
12:30 p.m., Skilling Auditorium
Transforming Graphical User Interfaces into Auditory User Interfaces
Beth Mynatt
Georgia Tech Computer Science
<beth@cc.gatech.edu>
Computers in non-desktop environments have become ubiquitous over the past
five years. But now we are faced with the chore of learning three
applications just to read electronic mail at our desk, on the phone, and with
a pager. One vision for the future is that a set of applications would follow
the user from the desk, to the car, to the warehouse, and to the board room.
The application interfaces would be transformed to suit each new environment
while remaining familiar to the user. One piece of this vision is
transforming graphical interfaces into auditory interfaces.
In this talk, I will describe a methodology for automatically transforming
graphical interfaces into auditory interfaces. This methodology addresses
analyzing and modeling the existing graphical interface, as well as designing
auditory interfaces to represent the interface model. In this transformation,
the salient characteristics of the graphical interface are conveyed using
combinations of speech and nonspeech auditory output. The underlying model of
the graphical interface, an annotated tree structure, forms the basis for
navigating the auditory interface. I have investigated these ideas by
designing an interface for blind users accessing graphical applications. With
my system, Mercator, blind users can work with auditory versions of the
graphical applications used by their sighted colleagues.
ELIZABETH MYNATT is a Research Scientist in the Graphics, Visualization, and
Usability Center at Georgia Tech. She directs the Multimedia Computing Group
which focuses on research in auditory and collaborative interfaces. Elizabeth
is the designer of the Mercator interface which transforms graphical
interfaces into auditory interfaces that are accessible for blind computer
users. Her main interest is in integrating computers into the physical
environment. To that end, she will be continuing to investigate transforming
user interfaces to meet user and environmental constraints, as well as
designing peripheral interfaces for collaborative systems.
____________
PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE
on Friday & Saturday, 26--27 May
Starting 2:00 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Conference on Early Modern Philosophy
Contact: Alan Nelson, UC Irvine <anelson@uci.edu> or
Marleen Rozemond, Stanford <rozemond@csli.stanford.edu>
This conference is made possible by a gift to the Stanford University
Philosophy Department from John and Claire Radway, and by additional funding
from the School of Humanities and Sciences. Each presentation will take
approximately 30--40 minutes. The remaining time will be devoted to general
discussion.
Session 1
Friday May 26: 2:00--5:15 Chair: David Owen (Arizona)
Topic: LEIBNIZ, by R.M. Adams
Marleen Rozemond (Stanford)
R.C. Sleigh, Jr. (Massachusetts)
Robert M. Adams (Yale)
Session 2
Saturday May 27: 10:00--12:15 Chair: John Carriero (UCLA)
Calvin Normore (Toronto) Topic: Continuity
Lawrence Nolan and Alan Nelson (UC, Irvine) Topic: Descartes on
Essence and Existence
Session 3
Saturday May 27: 2:15--5:30 Chair: Hannah Ginsborg (UC Berkeley)
Rachel Cohon (Stanford) Topic: Hume's Moral Philosophy
Edwin McCann (USC) Topic: Locke
Houston Smit (Stanford) Topic: Kant on Cognition and the
Unity of Apperception
____________
LINGUISTICS COLLOQUIUM
on Friday, 26 May
3:30 p.m., Building 460, Room 146
On the "Landing Site" of "Scrambling"
Hajime Hoji
USC Linguistics
<hoji@usc.edu>
It is widely believed that the "scrambled site" in the case of clause-internal
"scrambling" in Japanese exhibits properties of a so-called A-position (as
well as those of a so-called A'-position), on the empirical bases that have to
do with the absence of Weak Crossover (WCO) effects and the "binding" of
_otagai_, the so-called reciprocal anaphor in Japanese. I.e., the "scrambled"
phrase, as the result of "scrambling," can be an antecedent of (what appears
to be)a bound pronoun and of _otagai_.
In this paper, I will first argue that WCO effects do show up in the relevant
scrambled sentences, if we choose certain binder-bindee pairs so as to force
Arg-binding, disallowing the possibility of Dem-binding, in the sense of Hoji
( 1995 ), in sharp contrast to the _niyotte_ passives; cf. Kuroda (1979) . I
will then turn to _otagai_ and demonstrate that it should not be treated as a
local reciprocal anaphor. The relevant empirical observations include (i) it
need not have its "antecedent" in its local domain, (ii) it need not have a
reciprocal interpretation of the sort typically associated with English _each
other_, even when it occurs in an argument position, (iii) it need not be
c-commanded by its "antecedent." (independently pointed out in Kuno and Kim (
1994 ), (iv) it allows "split antecedence." I propose that the internal
structure of _otagai_ is very much like _sorezore_ 'each, respective', i.e.
roughly, [pro otagai] and [pro sorezore]. The conclusion at this point is
that the empirical bases adduced in the literature for the A-positionhood of
the "landing site" of clause-internal "scrambling" are not as solid as one
might think.
I will then discuss the nature of the contrasts reported in the literature
regarding the absence of WCO and the "binding" of _otagai_. As to the absence
of WCO effects, I will argue that the prototypical instances of it involve
Dem-binding in the sense of Hoji (1995). Since a similar absence of WCO is
observed in WH-interrogative sentences in English as well, it should not
constitute evidence for the A-positionhood of the "landing site" of
"scrambling." The apparent (un)availability of the "binding" of _otagai_ will
be argued to be due to restrictions on backward "zero pronominalization." I
will demonstrate that backward "zero pronominalization" is possible, depending
upon lexical selections (and given certain pragmatic contexts), e.g. [pro(i)
otagai]'s lover(s) seduced [John and Bill](i). In examples like this, what is
at stake is coreference between pro and [John and Bill]. Hence we expect WCO
effects if the matrix object is changed into a quantified NP or if we consider
the sloppy identity context with _otagai_. I will show that the prediction is
indeed borne out.
Finally, I will turn to the question of why some speakers detect improvement
of the Arg-binding possibility, to varying degrees, as the result of
"Scrambling." I suggest, in part based on Kuroda's (1992, Ch. 1) theory of
judgment forms and sentence forms, that what appears to be scrambled sentences
can be represented in the form of what we might call syntactic predication and
explore some of its consequences.
____________
INTENSIONAL LOGIC LECTURE
on Wednesday, 31 May
1:15 p.m., Building 90, Room 92-Q
Modal Theorem Proving
Grisha Mints
Stanford Philosophy
<mints@csli.stanford.edu>
This is one in a series of talks on recent developments in and around modal
logic by some guest speakers, illustrating connections with linguistics,
philosophy, computer science, and AI. The first part of this quarter has been
devoted to basic techniques: models and bisimulation, frame correspondences,
modal deduction, completeness arguments, filtration and finite model property.
All interested persons are welcome! All sessions will be in 90-92Q (upstairs
colloquium room, Philosophy Department), Mondays & Wednesdays 1:15--2:30 p.m.
____________
SEMINAR ON COMPUTATIONAL LEARNING AND ADAPTATION
on Wednesday, 31 May
4:00 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Frameworks For Visual Learning
John Weng
Michigan State Computer Science
<weng@cps.msu.edu>
This talk discusses some major difficulties encountered by currently
prevailing approaches to computer vision and describes the approach of
comprehensive visual learning, which involves two key ideas: that learning
must comprehensively cover the visual world; and that it must comprehensively
cover the vision system. Some critical issues to be discussed include: the
problem of high dimensionality; the automatic selection of features; learning
invariance to size, position, and orientation; segmentation of objects from
cluttered background; system self-organization through learning; indexing into
a large visual knowledge base; decision making; and the coordination of
learning with sensing and control. A new framework called SHOSLIF will be
described, along with preliminary results in applying it to the problems of
face recognition, hand-sign recognition, and autonomous navigation. Its
predecessor, the Cresceptron, will also be briefly discussed.
____________
STASS SEMINAR
on Thursday, 1 June
10:00 a.m., Building 90, Room 92-Q
Constraints on Reciprocity
Stanley Peters
Stanford Linguistics
<peters@csli.stanford.edu>
Reciprocal statements express differing concepts of reciprocity according to
their situation of utterance, as can be imagined by contextualizing the
following examples.
Legislators refer to each other indirectly.
Five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other.
They stacked tables on top of each other.
The pirates stared at each other in surprise.
The concept of reciprocity expressed by an utterance is constrained to be
consistent with certain nonlinguistic information which pertains in the
utterance situation to interpreting the reciprocal expression, e.g., the
constraint that pitchers, being people, have only two sides; and that surprise
lasts only long enough to allow staring at no more than one person. The
concept expressed is further constrained to be the one that gives the
strongest information content to the reciprocal utterance.
These claims will be supported with data, a situation semantic analysis will
be explored, and some consequences for semantic theory will be discussed.
____________
CSLI SEMINAR
SERIES ON INTELLIGENT AGENTS
on Thursday, 1 June
12:15 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Title to be announced
Michael Fehling
Stanford Engineering-Economic Systems
<fehling@lis.stanford.edu>
____________
CSLI SEMINAR
on Thursday, 1 June
2:15 p.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
Aspectual Adverbs and their Anaphoric Presuppositions
Alice ter Meulen
Indiana Philosophy
<atm@phil.indiana.edu>
The way in which we express information in time about time in natural language
provides a core empirical domain to study the dynamics of interpretive and
inferential processes in context. In this paper the truth-functional content
of aspectual adverbs -- e.g., already, still, not yet, no longer -- is
characterized as a polarity transition, preserving or reversing the given
polarity. But their presuppositions depend systematically upon their content,
creating temporal as well as nominal anaphora between context and content. An
indefinite NP in the scope of a negative polarity is projected into the
restrictor by accommodating the anaphoric presuppositions of the aspectual
adverb. This gives its reference marker universal force and makes it available
for unselective binding, as in (1).
(1) Every farmer who no longer owns a donkey, misses it dearly.
Similar universal force effects are observed in the interaction of aspectual
adverbs with epistemic modalities and tense inflection in (2).
(2) a. John is still asleep.
b. John was asleep.
c. John fell asleep and has been asleep ever since.
d. John must have been asleep.
e. John must be asleep.
Asserting (2a) logically presupposes (2b), but requires the much stronger
anaphoric presupposition (2c) to be entailed by the context as well. After
(2c) is globally accommodated, (2d, e) are entailments. Since (2a) expresses
stative information, the event of John's falling asleep that serves as
temporal antecedent in (2d) must precede now, but cannot be located more
precisely.
The essential difference between asserting information and accommodating it,
is transparent in the different temporal anaphora created by (3a) and (3b),
where only (3a) entails (3c). To express the information contained in (3a)
without aspectual adverbs, (3d) comes closest, but it still fails to establish
the essential indexical connection, triggered only by aspectual adverbs,
between the time of Mary's arrival and John's being asleep.
(3) a. Mary arrived. John was still asleep.
b. Mary arrived. John fell asleep and he has been asleep since.
c. John was asleep when Mary arrived.
d. Mary arrived. John had fallen asleep and he had been asleep since.
When the context contains incompatible information, entered into it by
interpreting prior discourse, accommodating (2c) may even have a
structure-building, dynamic effect, forcing his falling asleep to be preceded
by the incompatible event already in the context. However, if the very last
update of the context introduced that event incompatible with the
presuppositions of (2a), the interpretation halts in tilt, as illustrated by
plainly contradictory (4a), forcing a last resort as-if-interpretation as
metaphor. If just stative information is asserted in between, as in (4b), the
context still does not admit the presupposition. A new reference time must be
introduced by the new sentence, as in (4c), now admitting the anaphoric
inference that John must have fallen asleep again after waking up at 9 and
before I checked on him.
(4) a. John woke up. He was still asleep.
b. John had a horrible night. He woke up at 9 screaming that a
crocodile was eating his toe. He was really upset and shaking
all over. I thought he never would want to go back to bed.
He was still asleep.
c. John had a horrible night. He woke up at 9 screaming that a
crocodile was eating his toe. He was really upset and shaking
all over. I thought he never would want to go back to bed.
When I last checked on him, he was still asleep.
This study shows that information does not just flow from the context to the
content, but just as importantly from the content to the context.
Accommodating anaphoric presuppositions may do much more than adding referents
to the domain, as it may even force new structure into the context. This
requires a relational, two-channel information flow, the co-dependency of
context and content.
____________
SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM
on Thursday, 1 June
4:15 p.m., Building 60, Room 61-F
Discreteness Run Amok
Brian Cantwell Smith
Xerox-PARC
<bcsmith@parc.xerox.com>
The debates still rage: Penrose, Edelman, Searle, Dreyfus. "We're not
computers," the critics say -- with great confidence. But what <are>
computers, such that we're not them?
Lots of answers are suggested: information processors, digital state machines,
algorithmic engines, nothing but 0s and 1s. Most severe is the claim that
computers are <formal>: formal symbol manipulators, things we can build formal
models of, things that can be studied formally. But what does 'formal' mean?
And are computers that?
No, I will argue. Ultimately, formality is a higher-order form of digitality:
discretness at the level of properties. Computers are <reputed> to be
discrete, through and through. But it's not so. Or so I claim. So it's not
clear that it's so sure that we're not them.
____________
CSLI WORKSHOP
on Friday through Sunday, 2--4 June
9:00 a.m., Cordura Hall, Room 100
4th CSLI Workshop on Logic, Language, and Computation
Contact: Yookyung Kim <yookyung@csli.stanford.edu> or
Atocha Aliseda-Llera <atocha@csli.stanford.edu>
On June 2-4, 1995, the Fourth CSLI Workshop on Logic, Language, and
Computation will be held at Stanford University. This annual event brings
together philosophers, linguists and computer scientists with an interest in
logic, with the overall aim of facilitating interdisciplinary interaction.
The previous three installments have been pleasant and productive, with a mix
of participants from (mainly) California and The Netherlands.
The Workshop is organized by Johan van Benthem, Stanley Peters, Atocha Aliseda
<atocha@csli.stanford.edu> and Yookyung Kim <yookyung@csli.stanford.edu>.
Workshop Program:
Each talk will consist of 30 minutes of presentation followed by
a fifteen minute question and discussion period.
FRIDAY, JUNE 2
Morning
I. Logic and Computation
Chair: John Mitchell
9:00-9:15 Opening Remarks
9:15-10:00 Andreja Prijatelj:
Free Algebras Corresponding to Multiplicative Classical
Linear Logic and Some Extensions
10:00-10:45 Ramesh Viswanathan:
Recursion Theory in the Semantics of Programming Languages
10:45-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-11:45 Rob van Glabbeek:
Process Algebra
11:45-12:30 Robert Staerk:
Reasoning about Pure Prolog Programs in Classical Logic
12:30-1:30 Lunch Break
Afternoon
II. Logic and Computation
Chair: Grigori Mints
1:30-2:15 Ronen Brafman:
Knowledge Considerations in Robotics and the Distribution of
Robotics Task
2:15-3:00 Pat Suppes:
Machine Learning of Natural Language
3:00-3:15 Coffee Break
3:15-4:00 Phil Kremer:
The Prosentential Theory of Truth and the Liar's Paradox
4:00-4:45 Charles Parsons:
Finitism and Intuitive Knowledge
SATURDAY, JUNE 3
Morning
III. Language and Computation
Chair: Solomon Feferman
9:15-10:00 John McCarthy:
Contexts as Objects in Logical Theories
10:00-10:45 John Perry:
Context and Indexicals
10:45-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-11:45 Mark Greaves / Dave Barker-Plummer:
Heterogeneous Reasoning
11:45-12:30 Drew Moshier:
Feature Logics
12:30-1:30 Lunch Break
Afternoon
IV. Language and Computation
Chair: Stanley Peters
1:30-2:15 Livia Polanyi and Martin van den Berg:
Discourse Structure and Discourse Contexts
2:15-3:00 Ann Copestake:
Semantic Representation for Machine Translation in Verbmobil
3:00-3:15 Coffee Break
3:15-4:00 Jan Jaspars and Megumi Kameyama:
Preferences in Dynamic Logic
4:00-4:45 Dag Westerstahl:
Anything Goes? On the Status of the Compositionality Principle
SUNDAY, JUNE 4
Morning
V. Language and Logic
Chair: Tom Wasow
9:15-10:00 Stanley Peters and Yookyung Kim:
Reciprocals in Context
10:00-10:45 Victor Sanchez-Valencia:
On Predicates that License Polarity Items
10:45-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-11:45 Bill Ladusaw:
Negation and Calculus of Saturation
11:45-12:30 Dorit Ben Shalom:
Semantic Trees
12:30-1:30 Lunch Break
Afternoon
VI. Language and Logic
Chair: Johan van Benthem
1:30-2:15 Javier Gutierrez:
Questions as Generalized Quantifiers
2:15-3:00 Cleo Condoravdi:
Strong Conditionals
3:00-3:15 Coffee Break
3:15-4:00 Louise McNally:
Using Property-type NPs to Build Complex Event Descriptions
4:00-4:45 Godehard Link:
Language and Ontology
The program could be changed in the future.
____________
SEMINAR ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION
on Friday, 2 June
12:30 p.m., Skilling Auditorium
Title and speaker
to be announced
____________
PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
on Friday, 2 June
3:15 p.m., Building 90, Room 91-A
Hobbes' Theory of Voluntary Motion
Tommy Lott
San Jose State Philosophy
____________
LINGUISTICS COLLOQUIUM
on Friday, 2 June
3:30 p.m., Building 460, Room 146
Simple Present Tense Actions in the Discourse of a Social MUD
Lynn Cherny
Stanford Linguistics
<cherny@csli.stanford.edu>
Text-based virtual realities accessible via Internet, or MUDs ("multi-user
dimensions"), have become very popular for socializing, teaching, and
academic conferencing. MUD communication is different from that in most other
Internet chat programs in that it allows both speech and action modalities.
The action modality, via the emote command, allows users to simulate physical
actions in third person, "Vivien waves at Bob." Uses of the emote command
and other communication options during conversation are in fact highly
socially conventionalized; a MUD may be considered a speech community (Gumperz
1972) with a particular linguistic register, which is partly dependent on
modality features (Halliday 1985) and communication affordances, as well as
in-group language knowledge. In this talk, I will concentrate on the use of
simple present tense in the MUD register, with which users simulate not only
communicative "gestures," but also narrate their "real life" actions while
they are MUDding (e.g., "Marie packs for her trip"), in a manner reminiscent
of that found in sports commentary register (Ferguson 1983).
Actions within the MUD are always reported in the third person simple present
tense, suggesting a similarity with speech acts like first person
performatives (Searle 1969, 1989), which become true as they are uttered.
Actions that are part of byplay during conversation in the MUD may have no
real world referent, and they are interpreted as punctual, started and
completed at time of utterance: "Jon shines on Lynn." Actions which
describe activity happening external to the MUD show complexity however; for
instance, they may report either intention to do something ("Joe really
disconnects this time"), or report actions already taken ("yduJ sends mail
to the dispute list"). I suggest that in part the aspectual class of the verb
determines which interpretation is valid, along with reference to a world,
either the MUD irrealis world or the real world. Activities are interpreted
as on-going events in the real world, but as punctual in the MUD world; and
achievements/accomplishments are assumed to have just occurred in both worlds
unless a simple futurate is invoked. I offer a DRT analysis inspired by the
event-based discourse treatments of Partee (1984) and Hinrichs (1986), which
generalizes to the data in the literature on sports commentary register, for
which no semantic treatment has been provided.
____________