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CSLI Calendar, March 31, 3:22
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Subject: CSLI Calendar, March 31, 3:22
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From: csli@csli.stanford.edu
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Date: Wed 30 Mar 1988 18:04:51 PST
C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S
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31 March 1988 Stanford Vol. 3, No. 22
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A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 31 March 1988
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall Reading: "Learning at the Knowledge Level"
Seminar Room by Thomas G. Dietterich
Discussion led by Kurt Konolige
(konolige@bishop.ai.sri.com)
Abstract below
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
New building Panel Discussion on Compositionality
Conference Room Per-Kristian Halvorsen (halvorsen.pa@xerox.com),
Stanley Peters (peters@russell.stanford.edu), and
Craige Roberts (croberts@csli.stanford.edu)
Abstract in last week's Calendar
3:30 p.m. Tea
New building
Courtyard
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 7 April 1988
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall Reading: "The Formal Semantics of Point of View"
Seminar Room by Jonathan E. Mitchell
Discussion led by Syun Tutiya
(tutiya@russell.stanford.edu)
Abstract below
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
New building The Texture of Intelligence
Conference Room Alexis Manaster-Ramer
(amr@csli.stanford.edu)
Abstract in next week's Calendar
3:30 p.m. Tea
New building
Courtyard
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ANNOUNCEMENTS
Don't forget our celebration of the new building on Thursday, March
31. Kurt Konolige will lead a TINLunch on "Learning at the Knowledge
Level" by Tom Dietterich; and Stanley Peters, Kris Halvorsen, and Craige
Roberts will give a mini-symposium on compositionality. Beginning at
3:30 we will have an extended tea complete with hors d'oeuvres,
drinks, and a jazz band.
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THIS WEEK'S CSLI TINLUNCH
Reading: "Learning at the Knowledge Level"
by Thomas G. Dietterich
Discussion led by Kurt Konolige
(konolige@bishop.ai.sri.com)
March 31
When Newell introduced the concept of the knowledge level as a useful
level of description for computer systems, he focused on the
representation of knowledge. This paper applies the knowledge level
notion to the problem of knowledge acquisition. Two interesting
issues arise. First, some existing machine learning programs appear
to be completely static when viewed at the knowledge level. These
programs improve their performance without changing their 'knowledge.'
Second, the behavior of some other machine learning programs cannot be
predicted or described at the knowledge level. These programs take
unjustified inductive leaps. The first programs are called symbol
level learning (SLL) programs; the second, nondeductive knowledge
level learning (NKLL) programs. The paper analyzes both of these
classes of learning programs and speculates on the possibility of
developing coherent theories of each. A theory of symbol level
learning is sketched, and some reasons are presented for believing
that a theory of NKLL will be difficult to obtain.
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NEXT WEEK'S CSLI TINLUNCH
Reading: "The Formal Semantics of Point of View"
by Jonathan E. Mitchell
PhD dissertation, Department of Linguistics, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, 1986
Discussion led by Syun Tutiya
(tutiya@csli.stanford.edu)
April 7
Some sentences are ambiguous in an interesting way. When you tell
your friend standing across a table that the cat is in front of the
table, the cat could be either between you and the table or between
the table and her. You might be tempted to say the sentence you have
just used should be interpreted relative to the point of view.
Problems concerning the concept point of view are unlikely to be
covered by the conventional notions in terms of which indexical
expressions have been dealt with in the tradition of formal semantics,
since the point of view normally is not expressed as a constituent of
a sentence used. There are also some languages in which the concept
point of view plays such an important role that you might think any
selection of a lexical item refers to the point of view from which the
speaker is speaking. In Japanese, for example, it is said that you
have to use different words to describe the same transference of a
property depending on from which point of view you are speaking, the
donor's, the donee's, or yours. There are a lot more sentences in
English and a lot more languages which are relevant to the problem of
point of view, or perspectivity.
It is natural, therefore, the concept point of view deserve linguists'
attention. But once you try to come up with a formal treatment of the
concept which is consistent with linguistic intuition and
philosophical insight, you are bound to be involved in the discussion
of the formal semantics of belief sentences, of the nature of mental
states, and the belief de se. Mitchell seems to have decided to take
on the whole job and concludes, among other things, that "the notion
of self-ascription is central to the explanation of perspectivity in
language." This led him to the idea of representing, within situation
semantics, the interpretation of a sentence in a bifurcated formalism
by ascribing to the sentence both the external and the internal
contents. The external content of a sentence is almost the same as
the propositional content or proposition expressed of an utterance of
the sentence. Well, what is the internal content, then? This is the
very question I want to be answered in the discussion.
The paper is naturally very long so I will compile some excerpts from
the dissertation to be picked up. Please be warned that my selection
of the parts to be read does not necessarily reflect the ultimate
claims of the dissertation.