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CSLI Calendar, February 4, 3:16


       C S L I   C A L E N D A R   O F   P U B L I C   E V E N T S
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4 February 1988                    Stanford                    Vol. 3, No. 16
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     A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
     Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
                              ____________
	   CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 4 February 1988

   12 noon		TINLunch
     Ventura Hall       Reading: "Some Uses of Higher-Order Logic
     Conference Room  	in Computational Linguistics"
			by Dale A. Miller and Gopalan Nadathur
			Discussion led by Douglas Edwards
			(edwards@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
			Abstract in last week's Calendar

   2:15 p.m.		CSLI Seminar
     Room G-19          A Nonmonotonic Account of Causation
     Redwood Hall  	Yoav Shoham
			(shoham@score.stanford.edu)
			Abstract in last week's Calendar
			
   3:30 p.m.		Tea
     Ventura Hall		
                             --------------
	   CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 11 February 1988

   12 noon		TINLunch
     Ventura Hall       Reading: "Default Reasoning, Nonmonotonic Logics,
     Conference Room  	and the Frame Problem"
			by Steve Hanks and Drew McDermott
			Discussion led by Hideyuki Nakashima
			(nakashim@csli.stanford.edu)
			Abstract below

   2:15 p.m.		CSLI Seminar
     Room G-19          A Type-free Theory of Types and Propositions
     Redwood Hall  	Jon Barwise
			(barwise@csli.stanford.edu)
			Abstract below
			
   3:30 p.m.		Tea
     Ventura Hall		
                             --------------
			  NEXT WEEK'S TINLUNCH
	    Reading: "Default Reasoning, Nonmonotonic Logics,
			 and the Frame Problem"
		    by Steve Hanks and Drew McDermott
		      Proc. of AAAI-86, pp. 328-33
		  Discussion led by Hideyuki Nakashima
		      (nakashim@csli.stanford.edu)
			    11 February 1988

      In the beginning was the frame problem. Then came nonmonotonic
   logics.  Nonmonotonic logics are meant to be the logical counterpart
   of the human default-reasoning process, which is capable of jumping to
   conclusions, neglecting irrelevant conditions without even thinking
   about them.  The history is explained clearly in the article, which is
   a good introduction to the field.

      However, the authors claim that nonmonotonic logics are not the
   solution to the frame problem.  They are too weak to capture human
   default reasoning.  The temporal projection problem (now known as "the
   Yale shooting problem") is introduced as an example.

      I want to discuss (0) the view that the frame problem is
   unsolvable, (1) why humans do not seem to have the same problem, (2)
   whether we need nonmonotonic logics to capture default reasoning.

			     --------------
			   NEXT WEEK'S SEMINAR
	      A Type-free Theory of Types and Propositions
			       Jon Barwise
		       (barwise@csli.stanford.edu)
			    11 February 1988

   Since the beginning of the century, starting with Frege and Russell,
   theories of types and propositions have played an important role in
   logic and the foundations of mathematics.  Recent applications in
   computer science and in the analysis of natural language have brought
   them back into the limelight.  In this talk I will outline a theory of
   types and propositions that not only avoids the paradoxes that plagued
   Frege and Russell, but also "explains" them.  Familiarity with
   situation theory is needed only for the last ten minutes of the talk.