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CSLI Calendar, Oct. 29, 3:5




       C S L I   C A L E N D A R   O F   P U B L I C   E V E N T S
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29 October 1987                    Stanford                     Vol. 3, No. 5
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     A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
     Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
                              ____________
           CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 29 October 1987


   12 noon		TINLunch
     Ventura Hall       Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories
     Conference Room  	of Reference"
			by John Perry
			Discussion led by Bob Moore
			(bmoore@sri.com)
			Abstract below

   2:15 p.m.		CSLI Seminar
     Room G-19          An Introduction to Situated Automata
     Redwood Hall  	Part I: Basic Concepts
			Stanley J. Rosenschein (Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
			Abstract in last week's Calendar
			
   3:30 p.m.		Tea
     Ventura Hall		
                             --------------
	   CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 5 November 1987

   12 noon		TINLunch
     Ventura Hall       Reading: "The Logicist Conception of Knowledge 
     Conference Room  	is too Narrow---But so is McDermott's"
			by Stanley J. Rosenschein
			Discussion led by the author
			(Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
			No abstract

   2:15 p.m.		CSLI Seminar
     Room G-19          An Introduction to Situated Automata
     Redwood Hall  	Part II: Applications
			Stanley J. Rosenschein (Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
			Abstract below
			
   3:30 p.m.		Tea
     Ventura Hall		

                             --------------
			  THIS WEEK'S TINLUNCH
   Reading: "Cognitive Significance and the New Theories of Reference"
			      by John Perry
		       Discussion led by Bob Moore
			       October 29

   In this paper, John Perry replies to Howard Wettstein's article "Has
   Semantics Rested on a Mistake?"  Wettstein has argued that the New
   Theory of Reference (actually a family of theories based on the notion
   of direct reference) cannot handle puzzles posed by Frege concerning
   the cognitive significance of language.  Since Wettstein finds the
   arguments for the New Theory absolutely convincing, he is driven to
   the conclusion that semantics has nothing to say about cognitive
   significance.  Perry argues that this is an overly pessimistic
   assessment, and that Frege's puzzles can be solved by drawing a
   distinction between the conditions under which an utterance expresses
   a true proposition and the proposition expressed.  Perry's principal
   claim is that, while the New Theorists have mainly concerned
   themselves with the latter, it is the former that should be identified
   with cognitive significance.  Thus arguments designed to show that the
   proposition expressed by an utterance cannot be its cognitive
   significance are irrelevant, and a broader theory of semantics can and
   should account for both.  In the discussion, I would like to raise the
   issue of whether getting the semantics of propositional attitude
   reports right forces a tighter connection between cognitive
   significance of an utterance and the proposition expressed by an
   utterance than either Wettstein or Perry is prepared to allow for.

			     --------------
			   NEXT WEEK'S SEMINAR
		  An Introduction to Situated Automata
			  Part II: Applications
			    Stan Rosenschein
			       November 5

   This is the second of two lectures on the situated-automata approach
   to the analysis and design of embedded systems.  This approach seeks
   to ground our understanding of embedded systems in a rigorous,
   objective analysis of their informational properties, where
   information is modeled mathematically in terms of correlations between
   states of the system and conditions in the environment. In the first
   talk we motivated the general framework, presented the central
   mathematical ideas on how information is carried in the states of
   automata, and related the mathematical properties of the model to key
   theoretical issues in AI, including the nature of knowledge, its
   representation in machines, the role of syntactic deduction,
   "nonmonotonic" reasoning, and the relation of knowledge and action.
   Some general technological implications of the approach, including
   reduced reliance on conventional symbolic inference and increased
   opportunities for parallelism were discussed.

   In the second lecture, I will describe the application of the
   situated-automata perspective to specific problems arising in the
   design of integrated intelligent agents, including problems of
   perception, planning and action selection, and linguistic
   communication.


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