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CSLI Calendar, Oct. 29, 3:5
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Subject: CSLI Calendar, Oct. 29, 3:5
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From: csli@csli.stanford.edu
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Date: Wed 28 Oct 1987 16:39:29-PST
C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S
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29 October 1987 Stanford Vol. 3, No. 5
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A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 29 October 1987
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories
Conference Room of Reference"
by John Perry
Discussion led by Bob Moore
(bmoore@sri.com)
Abstract below
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Room G-19 An Introduction to Situated Automata
Redwood Hall Part I: Basic Concepts
Stanley J. Rosenschein (Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
Abstract in last week's Calendar
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 5 November 1987
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall Reading: "The Logicist Conception of Knowledge
Conference Room is too Narrow---But so is McDermott's"
by Stanley J. Rosenschein
Discussion led by the author
(Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
No abstract
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Room G-19 An Introduction to Situated Automata
Redwood Hall Part II: Applications
Stanley J. Rosenschein (Stan@warbucks.ai.sri.com)
Abstract below
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
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THIS WEEK'S TINLUNCH
Reading: "Cognitive Significance and the New Theories of Reference"
by John Perry
Discussion led by Bob Moore
October 29
In this paper, John Perry replies to Howard Wettstein's article "Has
Semantics Rested on a Mistake?" Wettstein has argued that the New
Theory of Reference (actually a family of theories based on the notion
of direct reference) cannot handle puzzles posed by Frege concerning
the cognitive significance of language. Since Wettstein finds the
arguments for the New Theory absolutely convincing, he is driven to
the conclusion that semantics has nothing to say about cognitive
significance. Perry argues that this is an overly pessimistic
assessment, and that Frege's puzzles can be solved by drawing a
distinction between the conditions under which an utterance expresses
a true proposition and the proposition expressed. Perry's principal
claim is that, while the New Theorists have mainly concerned
themselves with the latter, it is the former that should be identified
with cognitive significance. Thus arguments designed to show that the
proposition expressed by an utterance cannot be its cognitive
significance are irrelevant, and a broader theory of semantics can and
should account for both. In the discussion, I would like to raise the
issue of whether getting the semantics of propositional attitude
reports right forces a tighter connection between cognitive
significance of an utterance and the proposition expressed by an
utterance than either Wettstein or Perry is prepared to allow for.
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NEXT WEEK'S SEMINAR
An Introduction to Situated Automata
Part II: Applications
Stan Rosenschein
November 5
This is the second of two lectures on the situated-automata approach
to the analysis and design of embedded systems. This approach seeks
to ground our understanding of embedded systems in a rigorous,
objective analysis of their informational properties, where
information is modeled mathematically in terms of correlations between
states of the system and conditions in the environment. In the first
talk we motivated the general framework, presented the central
mathematical ideas on how information is carried in the states of
automata, and related the mathematical properties of the model to key
theoretical issues in AI, including the nature of knowledge, its
representation in machines, the role of syntactic deduction,
"nonmonotonic" reasoning, and the relation of knowledge and action.
Some general technological implications of the approach, including
reduced reliance on conventional symbolic inference and increased
opportunities for parallelism were discussed.
In the second lecture, I will describe the application of the
situated-automata perspective to specific problems arising in the
design of integrated intelligent agents, including problems of
perception, planning and action selection, and linguistic
communication.
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