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Newsletter June 13, No. 33
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Subject: Newsletter June 13, No. 33
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From: csli@csli.stanford.edu
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Date: Wed 12 Jun 1985 16:53:43-PDT
C S L I N E W S L E T T E R
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June 13, 1985 Stanford Vol. 2, No. 33
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A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *THIS* THURSDAY, June 13, 1985
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall ``Type Raising, Functional Composition,
Conference Room and Non-Constituent Conjunction''
David Dowty, Center for the Advanced Study of
the Behavioral Sciences
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Redwood Hall No seminar
Room G-19
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:15 p.m. CSLI Colloquium
Redwood Hall No colloquium
Room G-19
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *NEXT* THURSDAY, June 20, 1985
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall ``How Many Possible Human Languages are There?''
Conference Room by Geoff Pullum, UCSC and CSLI
Discussion led by Gerald Gazdar, CASBS
(Abstract on page 2)
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Redwood Hall No seminar
Room G-19
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:15 p.m. CSLI Colloquium
Redwood Hall No colloquium
Room G-19
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ANNOUNCEMENT
No seminars or colloquiums are scheduled for June 13 or June 20
because of the University, end-of-quarter break. TINLunch will be
held on these days. Regular activities will resume on June 27.
Page 2 CSLI Newsletter June 13, 1985
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ABSTRACT OF NEXT WEEK'S TINLUNCH
``How Many Possible Human Languages are There?''
Linguistic Inquiry 14, 447-467.
Beginning with Chomsky (1980), a number of linguists have claimed
(i) that their favored grammatical framework only allows for the
existence of a finite number of grammars,
(ii) that there only exist a finite number of possible human
languages.
Pullum's paper, published two years ago, argues that claim (i) is
false in every relevant case, and that claim (ii) is uninteresting,
even if true. His paper has been greeted by a deafening silence. How
can this be? Are his arguments so obviously invalid that it would be
cruel and undignified to reply to them? In which case, how did they
get into print? Or are they so obviously valid that those attacked
are ashamed even to allude to the matter? In which case, what are we
to make of their intellectual integrity? --Gerald Gazdar
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RRR MEETINGS
The RRR meeting of May 28 was on representationalism and was led by
Ned Block. He mentioned a number of distinctions among representationa-
list views, most importantly the by now familiar (in RRR) distinction
between (1) thoughts have representational parts and (2) thoughts are
sentential. He observed that the arguments usually given for the
latter better support the former, and claimed that evidence for the
latter view is not statable succinctly, but rather is suggested by a
mass of experiments, no small group of which is very convincing.
At the meeting of June 4, Kurt van Lehn gave an exposition and
critique of ``connectionism''. The view's opponents had different
complaints. Van Lehn argued that the successes of the connectionist
movement have had little to do with its controversial architectural
proposals. Jerry Fodor faulted connectionist models for not handling
the kind of thinking involving reasoning from one step to another,
while Brian Smith pointed out that connectionism was committed to an
overly ``iconic'' conception of representation. Pentti Kanerva said
that he was working on a connectionist theory that might be able to
overcome the faults that had been pointed out.
Upcoming meetings: There was NO meeting on June 11 (because of
conflict with the Workshop on Language Processing. The next RRR
meeting will be on June 18; we will discuss Jerry Fodor's ``Why there
STILL has to be a Language of Thought''. Unless there is a change of
plans, the June 18th meeting will be the last for the spring quarter.
We won't meet over the summer; what will happen next year is far from
clear. --Ned Block
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CSLI REPORT
Report No. CSLI-85-25, ``An Internal Semantics for Modal Logic:
Preliminary Report'' by Ronald Fagin and Moshe Vardi, has just been
published. This report may be obtained by writing to David Brown,
CSLI, Ventura Hall, Stanford, CA 94305 or Brown@SU-CSLI.
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