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Newsletter Apr. 18, No. 25
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Subject: Newsletter Apr. 18, No. 25
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From: csli@csli.stanford.edu
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Date: Wed 17 Apr 1985 17:11:18-PST
C S L I N E W S L E T T E R
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April 18, 1985 Stanford Vol. 2, No. 25
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A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *THIS* THURSDAY, April 18, 1985
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall A. P. Martinich's ``A Theory for Metaphor''
Conference Room Discussion led by Paul Schacht
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Redwood Hall ``The Formality of Computation''
Room G-19 Brian Smith, Xerox PARC and CSLI
Discussion led by Stan Rosenschein
(Abstract on page 2)
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:15 p.m. CSLI Colloquium
Redwood Hall ``Two Examiners Marked Six Papers: Interpretations
Room G-19 of Numerically Quantified Sentences''
Martin Davies, Birkbeck College, U. of London
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CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *NEXT* THURSDAY, April 25, 1985
12 noon TINLunch
Ventura Hall ``Cell Psychology: An Evolutionary Approach to
Conference Room the Symbol-Matter Problem'' by H. H. Pattee
Discussion led by Ivan Blair, CSLI
(Abstract on page 2)
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Redwood Hall ``Whither CSLI?''
Room G-19 John Perry, Director, CSLI
(Abstract on page 3)
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:15 p.m. CSLI Colloquium
Redwood Hall ``The Representational Basis for Everyday Aesthetic
Room G-19 Experience -- A Motivational Constraint on Learnable
Systems of Knowledge''
Tom Bever, Columbia University and CASBS
(Abstract on page 3)
Page 2 CSLI Newsletter April 18, 1985
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ABSTRACT OF THIS WEEK'S SEMINAR
``The Formality of Computation''
Most people would agree that computation is ``formal'' -- as for
example in the claim that computation is ``formal symbol manipulation''.
I will argue, however, that there is no reading of the term ``formal''
under which such a claim is both interesting and true. More
specifically, I will argue that the conditions we have called formality
are really projections into the symbolic or representational domain of
constraints arising from physical embodiment. As a consequence, I
will propose that a proper account of computation -- especially one
designed to mesh with other concerns at CSLI -- should set aside the
notion of formality and pay much more attention to matters of embodiment.
Note that I will NOT claim:
(i) that ``formal'' doesn't mean anything at all (in fact I will
propose several different coherent things it can mean);
(ii) that computation isn't representational (only that adding the
term ``formal'' doesn't buy you anything extra);
(iii) that current computers aren't formal, under at least one
coherent reading of the term (in fact I think they are).
I will also argue that we should distinguish two different reigning
notions of computation: one digital, one representational. Most
current computer systems, I will suggest, are digital, representational,
and formal. My claim is only that these three notions differ in
meaning, and could differ in extension as well. Only the first two
seem likely candidates in terms of which to define the notion(s) of
computation. --Brian Smith
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ABSTRACT OF NEXT WEEK'S TINLUNCH
``Cell Psychology:
An Evolutionary Approach to the Symbol-Matter Problem''
The central problem that Pattee is concerned with is that of the
relation between a symbol and its referent, what he calls the
matter-symbol problem. In other papers, he draws the same basic
distinction in terms of a dynamic (physical) mode and a linguistic
(symbolic) mode of operation of certain systems. Pattee has
consistently argued that the matter-symbol problem occurs at the level
of the single cell (genetic symbol and phenotypic referent, where this
terminology is to be taken seriously and literally, not
metaphorically), and that we should study this comparatively simple
example, using it as a test case for theories about the nature of
representation. One question to which we would like an answer is,
What distinguishes physical interaction from genuine symbol
manipulation?
In this article, Pattee considers both the information processing
approach and ecological realism, arguing that neither can offer any
real insight into the central problem, since each ignores one half of
it. The computational approach typically omits constraints that could
arise from material structures (instantiation in specific hardware)
from consideration and focuses on the more abstract level of programs,
while ecological realism ignores totally the symbolic side of the
problem. Adoption of formal, or logical concepts in the one case, and
physical concepts in the other, prohibits formulation of the problem.
Pattee's own approach, which embraces both the perspectives of symbol
processing and physical dynamics, attempts to relate these and
provides necessary conditions for a system to be dealing in symbols.
Page 3 CSLI Newsletter April 18, 1985
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ABSTRACT OF NEXT WEEK'S SEMINAR
``Whither CSLI?''
Since no other forum is conveniently available, I am going to abuse
the seminar format for a practical talk rather than a report of
research.
I will discuss the problems and opportunities facing CSLI, and how
they relate to budget, computing environment, future funding
opportunities and the structure of our research effort. --John Perry
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ABSTRACT OF NEXT WEEK'S COLLOQUIUM
``The Representational Basis for Everyday Aesthetic Experience --
A Motivational Constraint on Learnable Systems of Knowledge''
The structure of everyday aesthetic judgements depends on computations
of mental representations and relations between representations.
Examination of objects of everyday aesthetic preference (e.g., simple
rhythms, shapes, and songs) affords a definition of the aesthetically
satisfying experience: such experiences involve the formation of
incompatible representations and their resolution within the framework
of an overarching representational system. The enjoyment of such
experiences follows from the extent to which they are like solving a
problem during normal cognitive development. Indigenous systems like
language must have formal properties that stimulate aesthetically
satisfying experiences as an immediate motivation for the acquisition of
abstract structures. That is, we learn a multi-levelled representational
structure for language because it is fun. --Tom Bever
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LINGUISTICS DEPARTMENT COLLOQUIUM
``Deterministic Parsing and Subjacency''
Janet Dean Fodor, University of Connecticut and CSLI
Rm. 200-217 (History Corner), Tuesday, April 23, 3:15
Berwick and Weinberg (1984, MIT Press) claim that their
deterministic parser predicts the existence and range of application
of Subjacency, and that this provides simultaneous support for
Subjacency as the correct description of the linguistic facts, and for
deterministic models of the human sentence parsing mechanism.
I argue that the determinism of their parser is irrelevant to their
predictions, and that in any case all four of their predictions are
false.
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AREA P-2 MEETING
``Lexical Phonology and Tone in Temne''
Will Leben, CSLI
Ventura Conference Room, Wednesday, April 24, 4:30
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